Date
Location
Presenters
Ruth Macklin, Ph.D.
Professor of Bioethics, Department of Epidemiology and Population Health, Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Robert Temple, M.D.
Deputy Center Director for Clinical Science, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research; Acting Director, Office of Drug Evaluation I, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
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Transcript
DR. GUTMANN: Welcome back, everybody. We are
now in session seven of this two-day commission
meeting, and I am very pleased to welcome our two
guests, Ruth Macklin and Robert Temple. And I
would -- will briefly introduce both of them. They are
widely known and respected, and will present us with
two different views on the topic of trial design and
international standards.
Ruth Macklin is Professor of Bioethics in the
Department of Epidemiology and Population Health at
Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York. She
currently co-directs an NIH Fogarty International Center
training program in research ethics, which takes place
in Buenos Aires, Argentina. She is a member of the
research protocol review panel in the Human
Reproduction program at the WHO, and she also serves on
the Vaccine Advisory Committee at WHO.
She has published more than 200 scholarly
articles and chapters in bioethics, law, medicine,
philosophy, and the social sciences. She is also
author or editor of 11 books, including "Against
Relativism," and, most recently, "Double Standards in
Medical Research in Developing Countries." Ruth,
welcome.
I will also introduce Dr. Robert Temple, who
is Deputy Center Director for Clinical Science at the
FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. He is
acting Director of the Office of Drug Evaluation, which
oversees the regulation of cardiorenal,
neuropharmacological, and psychopharmacological drug
products.
Dr. Temple has a long-standing interest in the
design and conduct of clinical trials, and has written
extensively on the subject, especially on the choice of
control groups in clinical trials, evaluation of active
control trials, trials to evaluate dose response, and
trials using enrichment designs. He also has a
long-standing interest in the hepatotoxicity of drugs—I have to confess I’m not sure what that is-liver?-Okay, now I know what that means, I should have known that--
having participated in the first detailed FDA-NIH
outside discussion of the subject in 1978.
Look forward to both your presentations.
Ruth, would you please begin?
DR. MACKLIN: Thank you very much. I am goi to have one very simple message, and the simple message
is to defend a single ethical global standard, or a
single global ethical standard. That is a simple
message. But understanding it and interpreting it is
not so easy.
So, there are some complications. The first
complication is what counts as an ethical standard.
How would you frame the statement? How would you frame
the standard that you claim that one might claim to be
a single global standard? So I'm going to give a
couple of candidates for such standards, and I'm going
to throw them out -- reject them, I mean.
(Laughter.)
DR. MACKLIN: One candidate for a single
standard might be phrased as follows: If it's
unethical to carry out research with a particular
design in a developed country, or an industrialized
country, it is unethical to do that same research in a
developing country. That's one candidate for how one
would compare the design, the research design, in a
developing and developed country.
Well, I argue that that's flawed, because the
particular circumstances can be sufficiently different
to warrant different designs. So, for example -- and
this is the example I am going to use twice -- research
on a preventive or therapeutic method that could be
used or designed to be used in remote, rural areas with
poor infrastructure could require an experimental
intervention or comparator that would not be used in an
industrialized country.
And I want to point out here and emphasize
that it's the infrastructure that is the problem, the
inability to conduct the trial, or to bring the
products of the trial.
Here is a second example that I am going to
throw out, another candidate for a single standard in
research design might be phrased as follows. All
participants in research should receive the level of
care they would receive in a developed country.
Now, some people around the table may
recognize that statement. I'm not sure anybody has
ever argued for it. But this is flawed for basically
the same reason as the previous one, because adherence
to this requirement would make it impossible to do
research designed to develop treatments for some
diseases or some conditions, again, in remote rural
areas of developing countries. Or, even if they're not
rural areas, there are places even in a city where the
infrastructure simply doesn't allow you -- you might
need an ICU, for example, an intensive care unit. So,
such research, however, is critically important to test
interventions that can benefit people in countries with
poor health infrastructures.
So these are some of the reasons why those
descriptions, or those interpretations of a single
ethical standard, will not work. So let me turn to
placebos, because that's the area in which Bob Temple
and I have grappled on many occasions, and the one that
seems to raise -- it's not the only research design
question--but seems to raise the most controversy.
And here is the double-standard position.
Placebo controls are acceptable in developing
countries, where many people lack access to proven
interventions. And the ethical defense is that
subjects are not made worse off than they would be if
they were not enrolled in the research at all, since
the placebo control group would get the placebo, which
would be, let's say, equivalent to nothing, and the
other half would get an experimental product that may
or may not work.
A second point is that a cost -- this is the
defense of double standards -- a costly proven
intervention would never be available to the
population. So why include it, according to this
argument, as an arm in the study if it's never going to
be available?
And the final point -- and this is boiling
down the argument to the barest essentials -- is that
research subjects are treated equitably. Now, what
does equitably mean here? The argument is they receive
the level of care that patients in the same community
receive for the same disease, or same condition. That
may be nothing if it's a placebo-controlled trial.
So, this is basically the argument that people
are not being made worse off. And the question is
whether that is a minimal ethical standard, or
a -- let's call it the minimalist view of ethics--that
you're not making people worse off, even if you might
design the trial in such a way that they could be made
better off.
Here is the single standard position on
placebos. This holds that the same standards -- again,
standards for use of placebo -- in the sponsoring,
industrialized country should be applied in the
resource-poor country. And here the statement is, "If
patients in a developing country who are not enrolled
in a clinical trial would receive no treatment, that
cannot justify -- that alone cannot justify withholding
an effective treatment from subjects in the research,"
if, in fact, one could design the research
appropriately.
I mean there are some premises here, that is
that you have adequate research design that can provide
answers. So that is the underlying premise, that is
that the science is sufficient to be able to obtain
answers.
So, the third point, placebos may not be used
in a control group in the poor country when an
effective treatment for that condition exists in the
industrialized country. So the question of justice
here is global justice. On the previous slide I said
local justice, meaning that the people who are in the
trial would be treated equitably, according to local
circumstances. But now we're looking at something
broader, and that's global justice.
So, I'm not sure how much the commissioners
are completely familiar with the international
guidelines, since we are talking about standards. So
the next few slides are simply going to pull out what
the international guidance – several--international
guidance documents say about research design.
Declaration of Helsinki in 2008. The
benefits, risks, burdens, and effectiveness of a new
intervention must be tested against those of the best
current proven intervention, except in the following
circumstances. And the first circumstance -- these are
probably better known than some of the other
guidelines -- the first circumstance is the use of
placebo or no treatment is acceptable in studies where
no current proven intervention exists. This is
non-controversial. Nobody rebuts that.
However, here is the tricky part -- and this
is my italics that I inserted -- "Wherefore compelling
and scientifically sound methodological reasons, the
use of placebo is necessary to determine the efficacy
or safety of an intervention, and the patients who
receive placebo or no treatment will not be subject to
any risk of serious or irreversible harm."
Now, the reason I italicized those words,
"compelling and scientifically sound methodological
reasons," is precisely because experts may disagree on
what is compelling and what is scientifically sound.
So there is where some of the debate is going to lie,
not so much with the first issue -- because the first
question, if there are no treatments, there is no
problem with using placebo. So, it's in the analysis
and determination of what is -- what are those
compelling and scientifically sound reasons.
Here is the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences, their statement of a
single standard. "In externally sponsored research,
the ethical standards applied should be no less
stringent than they would be for research carried out
in the sponsoring country." So this is now a statement
about an international standard, a global standard.
But it is not enough clarity on what constitutes
standards.
The UN AIDS document, which is a companion
document to the one that Mitchell Warren talked about
this morning, here is what they say. This is their
comment on control groups. "The use of a placebo
control arm is ethically acceptable in a biomedical HIV
prevention trial, only when there is no HIV prevention
modality of the type being studied that has been shown
to be effective in comparable populations."
Here, however -- and they do give a couple of
examples: a vaccine that is not known to be effective
against a virus that is prevalent, or a microbicide
shown to be effective for vaginal intercourse but not
for rectal intercourse. So it can be different
populations, it can be a different product. So, those
are examples that can show when it would be possible or
acceptable to use placebo.
I am going to skip this, because the time is
running, and go to the ICHGCP, which is not an ethics
document, but this section of their efficacy section
has this to say. "In cases where an available
treatment is known to prevent serious harm, such as
death or irreversible morbidity in the study
population, it is generally inappropriate to use a
placebo control." Note that it says "generally."
"In other situations where there is no serious
harm, it is generally considered ethical to ask
patients to participate in a placebo-controlled trial,
even if they may experience discomfort as a result."
And here are the two ethical points: "provided the
setting is non-coercive, and patients are fully
informed about available therapies and the consequences
of delaying treatment."
So, my last slide here, next-to-the-last
slide, is a statement from this European group. And
this is the point at which I want to emphasize,
which is that economics alone should not be the
determinant about -- of whether or not one may use a
placebo in a poor country. The European group says,
"Research activities involving human subjects cannot
exclusively be assimilated to an economic activity
subject to market rules."
On the contrary, in the context of solidarity,
regarding health as a public good, rather than as a
commodity, it needs to be regulated according to
fundamental principles. The general approach chosen
within this opinion is that fundamental ethical rules
applied to clinical trials in industrial countries are
to be applicable everywhere. So that is the global one
single standard.
And my conclusions -- I have one more slide,
sorry -- the basic value underlying the defense of a
single ethical standard is global justice. And the
disparity in economic circumstances is not a morally
relevant factor for determining ethical standards for
research design, when the external sponsor is a wealthy
country or a pharmaceutical company.
And in -- my critique of double standards
concludes that financial inequalities -- to endorse
double standards would be to include that financial
inequalities should be a significant determinant of
global justice in the design of research.
DR. GUTMANN: Thank you, Ruth. Robert?
DR. TEMPLE: Now, let me just say
preliminarily that the main issue in a lot of this is
-- turns on what the consequence of not getting the
standard therapy is, and that will come up repeatedly.
The major concerns in all this about the use
of placebo are two main issues. One is there is a
general concern about the use of placebos, mostly
raised by the 2000 Declaration of Helsinki -- I will
touch on that -- and then the fundamental question of
what a person in a trial is entitled to, best local
versus best global therapy, all of which Ruth has
touched on.
And a second important issue on the case where
being deprived of the therapy could have consequences
to the patient that are serious is where this is being
done, and whose interest the trial is serving. And I
will try to get to those.
In symptomatic conditions -- this is a long
story; I will be glad to dilate on it later, if you
want -- in symptomatic conditions with very few
exceptions, only a trial showing a difference between
treatments is going to be interpretable. If you merely
see no difference, that is what is sometimes called
equivalence or non-inferiority in symptomatic
conditions, it is usually impossible to determine
whether the drug, in fact, worked. We have a long
guidance out on non-inferiority studies. This was also
addressed in the ICH document E10.
The main trouble is, with symptomatic
conditions, you don't know whether the supposed act of
control actually had the effect it was supposed to have
in the trial. A typical example is depression, where
drugs we are quite sure work beat placebo about 50
percent of the time. So if you do a trial and you see
no difference from the active control in a depression
trial, how do you know whether this was a trial that
could tell, or a trial that couldn't tell the
difference between active and inactive treatments?
So, with exceptions, symptomatic conditions
generally need to show a difference. You can be
better, or you can beat a placebo. That's what you
have to do.
So, in 2000, when the World Medical
Association essentially banned placebos whenever there
was a known effective therapy -- as Ruth showed you, if
there is no effective therapy, placebos are fine -- had
people followed that advice, there would have been no
more development of symptomatic treatments if there was
an existing therapy.
Now, some people would say if the new therapy
isn't better than the old ones, who cares anyway, but
we can go into that. New treatments often have
advantages that are not in the form of superiority.
They may be better tolerated, there is lots of reasons.
They may have additive effects, when you study them
later. You do want new symptomatic treatments, in
general.
So, let me just go quickly through the
Declaration. So, from the very beginning, at least as
early as 1975, the Declaration said in every medical
study, every patient, including those in control, if
any, should be assured of the best proven diagnostic
and therapeutic method. It has always been unclear to
me what they meant by that, because even in an active
control trial people aren't getting the best therapy,
they are getting something somebody wants to test.
Anyway, there were some people -- notably
Rothman and Michaels in a pretty famous New England
Journal of Medicine article in 1995 -- said that means
if there is an existing therapy, you can't use a
placebo. And you know, in arguments on stages, Ken
Rothman said you can't test a new drug for baldness
because there was Rogaine. You can't have a placebo
control trial of baldness or seasonal allergic
rhinitis. You just can't ever do it. It's unethical
and unacceptable.
Of course, as I said, read literally, the
active control trial also doesn't give people a known
effective therapy. So, as a result, nobody took this
particularly seriously until 2000, when, as Ruth showed
you, it now said the benefits, risks, burdens, et
cetera, have to be compared. You can use a placebo
when there is no known therapy. But, otherwise, it
clearly says you can't. So that means if there is an
existing therapy, an allergic rhinitis, baldness,
whatever it is, you cannot do a placebo control trial.
Everybody noticed. IRBs were very concerned, because
they thought you wouldn't be able to do trials any
more.
After a lot of concern by FDA, HHS, and a lot
of people, the World Medical Association eventually
changed it. They made a mistake initially. They said,
"Where for compelling" -- this was in 2001 -- they
said, "Where for compelling methodological reasons it
was necessary to use a placebo, or where a prophylactic
diagnostic was being investigated for a minor
condition."
Well, that's not right. That first one is
grossly unethical. That says if you can't get
information, except with a placebo control trial and
you have to kill a lot of people to get that
information, it's okay. That's wrong. They fixed it
in 2000. It now lumps those two together, and it
basically says if no harm will come to people -- you've
seen this already, so I won't repeat it -- if no
serious harm will come to people, and if it is
methodologically necessary, placebo control trials are
okay. That's what it says as of 2008, and I think
there is pretty general agreement that that's okay.
ICH E-10 in 2000, in my view, got it quite
right, and it said the principal issue in use of
placebos is the ethical one. There is no issue when
there is no effective therapy. The question is when is
it acceptable not to give existing therapy to people in
randomized -- with a drug or placebo. And I am -- I
underlined "available," because that's what it said.
In cases where available therapy is known to prevent
severe harm, you cannot use a placebo.
The "generally," by the way, was a hedge
word -- I remember it, because I threw it
in -- referred to cases where the treatment is so toxic
that people won't take it. So low-dose AZT was tested
against placebo, because nobody would take the high
dose. So that was the only exception. It wasn't meant
to hedge too much.
In other situations where there is no serious
harm -- and, you know, Zeke Emanuel says, "Well,
serious harm, irreversible harm, those are all
ambiguous" -- I don't think it's that ambiguous. If
it's really bad for people not to get an available
drug, you mustn't not give them a placebo. And there
could be arguments about how much vomiting is
unacceptable. We all agree. ICH E-10 says that.
Where there is no serious harm it is generally
considered ethical to ask patients to participate in a
placebo-controlled trial, even if they may be
uncomfortable. You have to give them adequate
information, they can't be coerced.
One could raise debates about how much money
is coercive -- perfectly good question. And it points
out whether a particular placebo-controlled trial will
be acceptable to subjects, investigators -- could be
debated. And one country might conclude one thing
about highly emetogenic chemotherapy, and another place
might think something else. And, of course, the
patient is supposed to be informed enough to know.
This is now more or less what the Declaration
says. ICH E-10 refers to available therapy. It is no
accident they didn't address the question of whether
available meant in that country, or all over the world,
because that was just too hard. They didn't want to get
in -- we didn't want to get in to the best local versus
best global.
So, under ICH E-10,however, this whole issue
is only of interest when you're talking about a
treatment that prevents serious harm, because those are
the treatments that would ordinarily have to be given,
if they were available. Symptomatic treatments are
probably not an issue, and I don't think there is much
controversy on that.
So, suppose the treatment really is
important -- and we actually discussed this at a WMA
meeting, and I would say there was a fair amount of
agreement on what I am about to tell you, but we'll see
what you think. Suppose a clinically-important
treatment is not available in a developing country.
That actually can happen in a developed country, where
a country chooses not to approve a treatment. That has
happened from time to time.
And -- but let's also suppose -- you have to
stipulate this -- that a comparison study comparing
some new treatment with the established treatment would
not be informed, that this is a case where you have to
have a placebo to have it be interpretable. And that
could be debated, too, but the issue doesn't arise in
that case. If a non-inferiority study is available,
you just do the non-inferiority study.
So, can you study a new drug with same
therapeutic goal as existing therapy in a developing
country, where the standard of care is not available?
And I think there are two distinct cases. One
is the one Ruth referred to, where the trial clearly
serves the interest of the country, because they can't
deliver the standard therapy, they don't have the
clinics, they don't have the techniques. The other is
where the trial is being done solely because of a
commercial interest. Someone wants to make use of the
fact that the drug is not available in that country to
do a placebo controlled trial that would plainly not be
acceptable in his own country. And you can get into
whether he plans to market the drug in the other
country, and all that stuff.
So, let's consider those two issues. The
general view at the WMA -- and I think Ruth referred to
this as the things that she worried about being
excluded -- was if you could say that the country
needed the information, that it was important to them,
and they needed to know the results -- and remember, it
couldn't be obtained with an active control trial -- it
was okay to do the trial.
The famous HIV transmission study which got a
lot of discussion is a good example of that. If it's
true that a non-inferiority study would not have been
informative and, as Ruth and I were just discussing,
that a historical controlled experience wouldn't have
been informative, the only way to find out whether
short-course HIV was effective was to do the placebo
controlled study. And that's why Barnes and Thatcher
wrote that it was okay.
The disagreement was largely from Wolfe &
Lurie, because they thought an active control trial
would have been acceptable, and I don't agree with
that. But that's not the philosophical argument.
Another example, we've been talking about the
use of rectal artesunate, where it really would have
been better to just give, you know, IV quinine or
something. And, in general, this refers to any therapy
really needed by the county that they have good reason
to get.
So, the thought there -- I think the general
agreement was that it would be acceptable not to give
the therapy that was available in the advanced country,
because you had no choice; it couldn't be given.
Briefly take the other --
DR. GUTMANN: Robert, I'm going to just ask
you to try to wind up. I need to give --
DR. TEMPLE: I can do that.
DR. GUTMANN: You will have a chance to answer
questions.
DR. TEMPLE: Okay. The other case is the
famous Surfactin case, which I won't dwell on, where
the purpose of the trial, plainly, was to get it
marketed in the U.S. There was good reason to believe
that nobody in the trial would be better off -- would
be worse off than they would have been without the
trial, but they clearly would not have gotten standard
therapy. Most people did not feel comfortable with
that approach. It was not for the purpose of a
country, it was so that somebody could get the data,
and to go market the drug in the United States.
I just want to pose the question that, having
abandoned that trial, which the company did under
publicity, it's very clear that more babies died in
Latin America than would have died if the trial had
happened. Now, nobody seems to be bothered by that,
but it seems worth thinking about. Because they
weren't getting the drug.
And I think that may be my end. Okay. We
sort of addressed this. Okay.
DR. GUTMANN: Thank you very much. This is an
active issue for us to consider. And I want to open it
up to commission members to make comments or ask
questions.
(No response.)
DR. GUTMANN: I will begin, if nobody -- let
me just ask both of you, because you have, no doubt,
read the sounding board response, "The Ethics of
Placebo-Controlled Trials: A Middle Ground," that was
in the New England Journal, co-authored by Ezekiel
Emanuel and Franklin Miller. It would be helpful for
us if we could hear your response.
Robert, to you, the authors say psychological
and social harm caused by depression, for example, are
either not considered or dismissed. In other words,
when -- you began to address this, but what
actually -- how broad are you -- do you want us to
interpret harm?
And let me just -- I will just pose the
complementary -- there are many questions here, but
this suggests a middle ground, just for us to
understand how far apart you really are.
Ruth, the co-authors say that the dichotomy
you've proposed between rigorous science and ethical
protections is false; scientific validity constitutes a
fundamental ethical protection. I'm sure you would
agree with that. But here is the -- if placebo
controls are necessary or desirable for scientific
reasons, that constitutes an ethical reason to use
them. Although it may not be a sufficient reason, it
is a reason.
So, if you -- if I start, either one of you,
if you could, just say where you see the common ground
lacking here, because it does seem like once you take
into account the need for scientific validity, which is
an ethical consideration, we believe, and once you take
into account a range of harms that would be serious
harms, there is not -- it is at least hard for me to
see why we can't agree on this middle ground from both
your perspectives, unless you really are orthodox, as
orthodox as this suggests you are.
You want to start, Ruth, and then we will do
Robert?
DR. MACKLIN: I should say that where I stand
with regard to that claim and the article, I am not a
defender of active control orthodoxy.
DR. GUTMANN: Okay.
DR. MACKLIN: The middle ground is between
placebo control orthodoxy and active control orthodoxy.
DR. GUTMANN: Correct, correct.
DR. MACKLIN: I accept the middle ground. I
accept the arguments. And I also accept the examples
that Bob gives of the circumstances in which -- which
he refers to as the symptomatic cases, in which you
really can't tell whether it's the disease, the
remission, the -- I accept all of that. So -- and the
middle ground actually tries to work between those two,
and --
DR. GUTMANN: Right.
DR. MACKLIN: -- that's the middle ground.
So --
DR. GUTMANN: Correct.
DR. MACKLIN: -- that's where I stand on that
issue.
DR. GUTMANN: Okay, okay.
DR. MACKLIN: Where I -- let me say the other
thing is I think there may not be agreement on what are
the scientifically and methodologically compelling
reasons to use placebo. And so the challenge there is
to see whether --
DR. GUTMANN: Okay.
DR. MACKLIN: -- there are other
methodologists who might challenge Bob's view on when a
trial might be uninformative in the non-symptomatic
cases.
DR. GUTMANN: Right, fair enough. Very good.
That's very helpful to us. Robert?
DR. TEMPLE: There might be somebody who would
do that, but we haven't been exposed to them. I think
there is broad agreement that if, under the
circumstances, we say an active control is not
informative -- I mean we just wrote a long guidance on
this, 40 pages of stuff to people to disagree with if
they want to. We have not had disagreements with the
fundamental principle; we have had disagreements about
some of the edges.
I didn't feel that Zeke described a middle
ground at all. I think he described what exactly our
position was. If you really believe that -- yeah, we
-- Susan and I talked about that considerably. We
didn't think -- it reads like E-10 to me. If you
really believe that not getting an anti-depressant is
going to be dangerous, if you have evidence to that,
then you can't study new antidepressants. Put it away.
We totally agree. The question is whether that is
true.
And if you look at, you know, thousands of
depression trials, you won't see an increased suicide
rate in the people who didn't get treated; you actually
see increased suicidality in the people who are
treated -- he didn't know that at the time he wrote
that; that's more recent news -- but if there is a
risk, even a low risk of something bad happening, then
you can't do it. We agree with that.
His example of severely emetogenic
chemotherapy, we have always been troubled by that and
thought that was at the edges. If it keeps you from
getting your chemotherapy, you have to either not do
it, design around it, or something like that.
And there are ways to make the period during
which a person is miserable and suffering shorter. You
can have your end point be the first sign of something,
instead of, you know, having to vomit for hours and
hours. You don't have to do that.
In the case of severely emetogenic
chemotherapy, actually, I'm quite sure you could do an
active control trial. But don't mistake that for
thinking that all studies work -- there has been a
review of studies of Ondansetron, which is the way you
prevent emesis. And in dozens and dozens and dozens of studies,
it failed to be placebo when it was being used
post-surgically. And the reason was simple. The
people didn't vomit, so you couldn't show an advantage.
So, in emetogenic chemotherapy, you probably
could use a non-inferiority study. There is a
legitimate question about whether people should be
exposed to this kind of misery. That's a perfectly
good question. There is -- we are -- I don't know what
the orthodoxy is. Everybody acknowledges that, so --
DR. GUTMANN: We are very pleased to --
DR. TEMPLE: I am comfortable with his
position.
DR. GUTMANN: We are very pleased to hear
that. We are not going to settle every scientific
dispute about particular studies, but if there is a
ground that the two of you agree on, that is an
important step forward.
So, let me call on Christine Grady.
DR. TEMPLE: I'll say one thing. I don't
think Ruth and I differ on very much. Probably the one
thing is the Surfactin case, where I'm not so sure that
is really wrong, and that deserves discussion. But I
realize most people don't agree with me. So I know
that.
DR. GUTMANN: Yeah. But there will be -- and
we could all agree on all the standards at a level of
specificity, and still disagree on particular cases
because of specifying the facts and the
counter-factuals.
So that is extremely important, what the two
of you have just said in response to my question. Let
me go on. Christine?
DR. GRADY: Thank you both. I think my
question follows a little bit on Amy's, in a certain
way, although I was thinking of it in a different way
before she started.
You both have been through the war, so to
speak, in terms of this controversy. And it sounded
like, from each of your presentations, that
with -- now, many years after the debates began, and
the changes to Helsinki, and the E-10, and the
literature that has been available to sort of carve
middle grounds, that actually, the disagreement between
you is hardly there at all.
And so, I guess the question that I would have
is, at this juncture in history, what do you think
needs to be done to sort of put this question to be, so
to speak? I mean what's still out there that is
troubling people, in terms of this question about
placebo control, or standard of care?
(No response.)
DR. GRADY: Or do you think we should put our
energy someone else? I guess that's part of the
question.
DR. MACKLIN: Well, I do think we should put
our energy someone else. But I think it doesn't help
to revisit the 076, that controversy, because people
are entrenched, and don't like to give up their
positions, whatever position they took. So that's not
helpful. New examples --
DR. GUTMANN: It's not helpful to go back to
those people who are entrenched, but that, if you ask a
lot of educated people who are following this debate,
that's where a lot of people think this is in this
debate, not where the two of you are now.
DR. MACKLIN: Well, I think what we have
to -- let me -- in order to answer the question, what
is the remaining disagreement between Bob and me?
Now, if it comes down to the Surfactin trial,
there was a -- later, an active control Surfactin trial
that was done, not a placebo-controlled trial. This is
not one of those cases of the symptomatic trial, of the
symptomatic situation.
So, the defense that Bob gave was fewer
babies -- yeah, some babies died that wouldn't
otherwise have died if the trial had been done. But
the question that arises is, "Why wasn't an active
control trial done? Why could it not have been done?
Would it not have yielded scientific information?" And
that's what I didn't hear. That, it seems to me --
DR. GUTMANN: So that's -- we're not going to
spend all our time on Surfactin --
DR. TEMPLE: No, but I will tell you we
concluded -- and whether this is right, in some sense,
doesn't matter -- but we concluded that showing
equivalence to the existing animal -- bovine-derived
surfactant would not be persuasive, because some of the
trials of the initial surfactant had not been
successful, even though we all know it's a wonderful
therapy, and it saves babies' lives.
What they eventually did was beat a synthetic
surfactant, which probably isn't as good as the actual
surfactant. So they were able to do a superiority
trial. A superiority trial would always have been
acceptable. No one would have ever doubted that. But
a non-inferiority trial to the bovine surfactant would
not have been interpretable.
Again, I am not all that knowledgeable about
the trial, so I don't know if that's true. All I would
say, though, is that if that is true, then you needed
to do a trial, show a difference.
By the way, they would never have done a
superiority trial in the Latin American countries, they
would have done it in the U.S. So that trial would
never have gone there, because, among other things, we
would have been less certain about the applicability to
the U.S. We worry about that.
So, it really is a case where the trial they
wanted to do could not have been done in the U.S.
Nobody disagrees about that. And it really focuses on
whether -- it really -- sort of depends on whether you
focus on the people in the trial, and how they are, or
how you feel about what it tells you about the world,
that you can do that trial there.
And I -- you know, I am into social justice,
but you've got to think about the people in the trial,
too. I think that's the tension.
DR. GUTMANN: John?
DR. ARRAS: Okay. So, Bob, I am detecting a
bit of a tension within your presentation, okay? So,
earlier in your presentation, you did make a
distinction that I think you thought was important
between studies that were done for the benefit of the
local population versus studies that are done simply
to, you know, get approval back here and market the
drug here. Right?
So -- but then, near the end -- and just now
-- you seemed to float a very different sort of
standard, which is what you might want to call a kind
of Pareto standard, you know. If people are made
better off, and nobody is made worse off, then it's
okay to do the study.
So, there is, I think, a tension between those
two sorts of standards, because you could say, well,
the fact that some people will benefit, you know, if
the trial is done, that's not a decisive reason if that
first principle is really paramount: namely, needed
within the local community, needed within that
country's public health structure.
So, could you discuss that a little bit? I
mean how do you reconcile those two? Because it could
be that you could just go with the second, right?
DR. TEMPLE: No.
DR. ARRAS: Okay.
DR. TEMPLE: The distinction is between what
the consequence of not getting the standard therapy is.
If it's a symptomatic condition, where the only
consequence of not getting the standard therapy is
you're symptomatic, I think that's okay anywhere you
want to do it.
And, for what it's worth -- I didn't mention
this -- the sorts of trials that people do of
depression in Eastern Europe and elsewhere are the very
same trials they do at home. So, everybody is treated
the same, and nobody comes to harm. I have no trouble
with any of those, wherever you do them.
There are people who are uncomfortable about
how many trials are being farmed out to poorer parts of
the world. Separate question. I have not been
addressing that.
This arises where there is clearly harm from
not getting the standard of care. And there I want to
make the distinction between -- this isn't necessarily
my position, but everyone is quite comfortable with the
idea that where doing the trial and not giving the
standard therapy is very much in the interest of the
country, because they will get a treatment for -- to
prevent HIV transmission that ain't the best, but it's
pretty good, or they'll treat malaria better than they
otherwise could have, even if it's not the best,
everybody, I thought, at WMA was very comfortable with
that.
What they're not comfortable with is my
thought that maybe it's okay to do a trial if everybody
in the trial is at least as well off as they otherwise
would be. People, in general, are not comfortable with
doing that in, say, Latin America for -- in order to
market a drug in the U.S. Okay?
And I think it's the social injustice. They
don't like the fact that you would have to do a trial
like -- that you could even get to do a trial like that
in those countries. They resent the disparity of
wealth, and things like that, all of which are
perfectly legitimate. I just think it's also important
to think about the people in the trial, because they
would have been better off.
DR. ARRAS: Well, yeah. And if you were a
parent of a child with that kind of lung condition, you
probably would want your child in that study.
DR. TEMPLE: I think you would. And they did.
That's why they wanted to do the trial.
DR. GUTMANN: Christine? Quickly, because we
have a hard stop.
DR. GRADY: I just wanted to follow up --
DR. GUTMANN: But I know Christine wanted to
follow up.
DR. GRADY: -- because it seemed like the
disagreement about Surfactin has to do more with what
some people call responsiveness or, you know, local
needs, than it does with the design of the trial, the
placebo.
So, is that right? I mean is the placebo
question settled, and we have to worry about these
other things, like whether or not responsiveness
matters? Or do we still have work to do on
what -- agreeing on when placebo is okay and not okay?
DR. TEMPLE: See, I think to approach the
ethical issue you should assume that you, in fact, did
need to do a placebo-controlled trial to get
information. I mean if you could do an equivalence
trial, then the issue doesn't arise. If you could find
a loser surfactant to beat, then the issue doesn't
arise, although you wouldn't do it in Latin America.
The issue arises where, for one reason or
another -- let's assume it's true -- you really can't
do an equivalence trial, and no one will let you do a
placebo-controlled trial where the drug is available,
because harm would come to people. You know, there is
a million drugs --
PARTICIPANT: Is there an example of that?
DR. TEMPLE: Oh, yeah. Suppose I want to know
whether a new -- okay, ACE inhibitors prevent death in
heart failure. Okay. How do I get a new ACE
inhibitor? How do I get that claim, if I'm a new ACE
inhibitor?
Well, I can't do an equivalence trial for a
variety of reasons, and the main reason is therapy has
marched on and now everybody gets a beta blocker and
Spironolactone, in addition to the ACE inhibitor. So I
don't know what the effect of the ACE inhibitor is. I
can't do the non-inferiority margin. So I can't do
that. But I could go to a country where there are no
ACE inhibitors, and show that the ACE inhibitor works,
compared to placebo.
Is that a good idea? Well, maybe if everybody
is better, and everybody gets a Spironolactone and a
beta blocker and a diuretic, and they're better off
than they currently are, and you compare added ACE
inhibitor with placebo, I'm not sure I'd object to that
trial.
But that's where the issue -- there is a
million things you can't study any more, because an
equivalence trial is uninformative, and you can't
deprive people of a known therapy that saves your life.
DR. GUTMANN: This has been enormously helpful
to us, and I think is an example of how bringing two
people who have sparred, but are very thoughtful and
responsive, can make a difference.
So, on behalf of the whole commission and
everybody present, we thank you very much.
(Applause.)