Date
Location
Presenters
Commission Members
Download the Transcript
Transcript
DR. GUTMANN: So that's a good segue, right?
We are going to talk now in this session addressing
directly the ethical standards of the day and, in
particular, here are the questions we want to address.
Did the researchers try to keep the
experiments secret? What standards did the researchers
employ to protect human subjects in an earlier
experiment conducted in Terre Haute, Indiana, in a
federal or state penitentiary there? I think it was a
state penitentiary, I think, state. What about in
Guatemala, how did the protections of human subjects in
Terre Haute compare to the protections in Guatemala?
And what standards were available at the time for the
protection of human subjects?
And I've asked Anita Allen to begin by a
summary of what the answers to those questions are and
then we will open it up again for discussion and again
if there are any members of the public who have -- we
didn't receive any questions in the last session but if
there are any questions that you want to jot down on
cards and deliver it up here, we welcome that.
Anita Allen, can you begin our discussion,
please?
DR. ALLEN: Thank you, Dr. Gutmann. The first
question you raised was whether the researchers tried
to keep the experiments secret and that question raises
another question which is why do we care?
Well, we care because secrecy sometimes
signifies mindfulness of wrong-doing and a desire, a
selfish one, to avoid ethical accountability.
Yes, Dr. Cutler and others did try to keep
complete information about the research protocols
involved in the experiments out of the hands of agency
officials, agency oversight officials, scientific
peers, the general public, and the research subjects
themselves and on this count, the researcher's own
words tell the story and I think some would say condemn
them.
In a letter in 1947 to his colleague, Dr.
Mahoney, Dr. Cutler confided that it would be advisable
to not have too many people concerned with this work in
order to keep down talk and premature writing and Dr.
Arnold expressed concern in 1947 that "some goody
organization might get wind of the work and raise a lot
of smoke." So people involved were definitely very
aware of their own efforts at concealment.
In 1955, looking back on the experiments, Dr.
Cutler admitted that efforts had been made during the
Guatemala years to confine knowledge to as few people
as possible. I quote him directly. "It was deemed
advisable to work so that as few people as possible
know the experimental procedure."
As the principal investigator, he clearly
wanted to avoid ethical criticism, to avoid
interference, and any political barriers to his work.
He even at one point said he wanted the research to be
"guarded and subterranean."
So to maintain Dr. Cutler's secrecy, he and
Dr. Mahoney worked hard at keeping reports away from
those who would normally get them. They adopted a set
of procedures that involved bypassing the normal
oversight officers in the agency and instead Dr. Cutler
would send everything to Dr. Mahoney who had promised
to keep things secret and when there was a requirement
to post a summary or report, Dr. Cutler offered what he
termed "barest summaries of our progress."
It's already been noted that Dr. Cutler's
final reports and results of the STD experiments were
never directly published. He himself, Dr. Cutler
himself sometimes seemed to insert little references to
his own research in some of his papers but they were in
a highly-disguised form, again trying to keep things
secret. So, yes, there was a lot of effort to keep
this stuff secret.
But in a way, we got to this point a little
bit earlier, the research was not secret. Framed as an
STD prevention and treatment research project, the
research was funded by the U.S. Public Health Service's
Venereal Disease Division and its Venereal Disease
Research Laboratory which is now part of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.
The research was conducted pursuant to open
agreements executed between the nation of Guatemala and
the United States. Many public officials,
institutional directors, physicians, researchers, were
aware of the broad outlines and research protocols.
Evidence shows that Guatemalan officials, including the
Ministry of Public Health, were aware of and supported
the research. The research staff for the experiments
included the National Psychiatric Hospital in
Guatemala, National Orphanage, Chief Army Medical
Department, as well as the Director and Assistant
Director of the Venereal Disease Research Unit, and
numerous other medical and scientific staff from that
office.
So while secret in one respect, in another
respect this was by no means a secret matter.
Indication of lack of secrecy, and an odd one, is that Dr.
Cutler did choose to keep his records. He didn't burn
them. He kept them and then in 1990 he donated them to
the University of Pittsburgh Archive where they sat and
others might review them which, indeed, happened in the
case of Dr. Susan Reverby who brought those records to
light very recently.
The second question was about whether what
standards were applied or employed in the protection of
human subjects in the Terre Haute Prison Experiments in
1943 and '44, an important question because what the
Terre Haute project shows is that some of the same
researchers, Drs. Mahoney and Cutler and others,
involved in STD research just a year or two earlier
than Guatemala did in fact show some regard for human
subject research values.
So just prior to Guatemala, research was
conducted by the Public Health Service at the Federal
Prison, Terre Haute Prison, and this was research that
was done in collaboration with and in cooperation with
the U.S. Bureau of Prisons.
The purpose of the research was to identify
chemical prophylaxis against gonorrhea, so as to
protect men in the Armed Forces from the disease in
order to protect military readiness at the time. It
was believed that something like seven million man
hours were lost every year due to gonorrhea at a cost
of about $34 million for treatment.
So there were 241 prisoners who participated
in the experiments in Terre Haute and these men were
inoculated with strain concentrations of gonorrhea
where the bacteria was deposited into the end of their
penises, as described earlier by my colleague.
The experiments were discontinued, however,
only 10 months after they began due to the inability to
reliably infect the men in spite of different strains
of gonorrhea and different modification methods of
inoculation.
So by the end of this particular experiment,
the researchers sadly concluded they had learned very
little and that they still didn't even know whether the
35-year-old silver protenate that they'd been using was
actually effective in preventing gonorrhea.
As for what standards were used, there were
two main standards that were employed to protect those
241 U.S. prisoners: risk minimization and informed
autonomous consent. Risk minimization measures
included situating the research at what at the time was
the very best federal prison in the nation, the one
with the best medical facilities I might say, and here
you have a captive population, but people were able to
get good medical treatment.
When it came to informed consent, in this
instance the prisoners were actually volunteers and
they were given a written informed consent document to
use to waive their rights and the document did make an
effort to explain to them the costs and benefits and
nature of the research.
The project, they were told, would study the
effectiveness of two types of prophylaxis against
gonorrhea and that with that information in hand, the
men could perhaps make a better decision about whether
or not to participate and they weren't over-induced.
The men were paid but they weren't paid so much that
they would do it as it were sort of compelled to do it
to get the money and while they were offered a
certificate of merit at the end of the research and a
commendation to the Parole Board, they weren't promised
early release from prison as a condition of
participation.
So risk minimization and informed consent or
autonomy were respected in the Terre Haute U.S.-based
experiments, even though we see in Guatemala those same
values and norms were not respected.
In Guatemala, the same researchers did not
offer their subjects informed consent and did not make
a serious attempt, I would argue, to minimize risk and
the subjects included some of the most vulnerable
people one could imagine: soldiers in active duty,
prisoners in prisons and jails, sex workers, some as
young as 18, children, people with leprosy, people with
epilepsy, people with mental illnesses, indigenous
Guatemalans, so-called Indians, poor people, uneducated
Latinos. This is the population of people that the
United States Public Health doctors went to Guatemala
to use as subjects for their research and they offered
them none of the same protections that were offered to
the U.S.-based research subjects in Terre Haute.
Why Guatemala? I think I've pretty much just
said it. Because the population was available and
vulnerable, powerless, but there were other reasons, as
well. There was a Dr. Juan Funes who was a Guatemalan
physician who had worked for one year as a fellow with
Drs. Mahoney, Arnold, and Cutler at the Venereal
Disease Research Center in Staten Island in 1945 and he
suggested the United States doctors go down to
Guatemala. He had a clinic there that he worked in and
that was made attractive by the fact that there was
already a preexisting relationship between the U.S. and
Guatemala to provide medical services and to develop
public health facilities down in that part of the
world.
The U.S. went to Guatemala bearing gifts of
medical infrastructure and some medications that were
scarce and expensive. The U.S. researchers felt they
would be able to employ some protocols they would not
be able to do in the United States. It wouldn't pass
muster with the U.S. ethical standards and also I
should note that in Guatemala, the use of prostitutes
was less troublesome because there it was both legal
and there was a provision of routine public health
examinations of the sex workers.
So in Guatemala, no informed autonomous
consent. The subjects were not told about the goals of
the study, the purposes of the study, the methods, the
risks, or the social benefits that might be involved.
The subjects included people who were well under 21
years of age, children, schoolchildren, and orphans,
and their parents were not offered informed consent and
the children were not offered informed consent either.
The subjects included prisoners, mental
patients, and others with lack of cognitive
competencies. The subjects included people who were
actively ill, people who were sick with chronic and
acute diseases. They were nonetheless included as
research subjects.
Superiors could force inferiors to participate
using deception about the purposes, about the risks
involved, and, of course, we had here very, very
disenfranchised people in general, people who just
didn't have the same education, knowledge of science,
medicine, and so forth that the public health doctors
had.
Very, very few risk minimization measures were
put into place. I think it even violates our sense of
human rights, what went on in Guatemala, not just the
lack of informed consent, not just a lack of research
minimization of risk, not just lack of privacy and
autonomy, but actually cruel and inhumane conduct took
place, abrading, scarifying, exposing to bacteria, to
meningitis, to neuro-syphilis. These are very, very
grave human rights violations and I think we'd have to
all agree.
So there was not the same level of protection
in Guatemala that was offered to subjects in the United
States.
What were the available standards at the time?
What ethical standards might the researchers have
relied upon?
Well, to start off with, they could have
relied upon ordinary morality and conscience. Those
were available. But such standards that we all learn at
our grandparents' knees were not followed. Why weren't
they followed? It's really impossible to say, but it
seems as though, seems to me personally as though the
researchers put their own medical, scientific and
personal advancement first and human decency and
respect for others a far, far second.
These experiments could not be approved under
contemporary regulations for human subjects research.
Informed consent today is key. Risk minimization is
key. Respect for vulnerable groups is key. But these
ideas were not unheard of in the 1940s. They were in
circulation and the researchers could have turned to
them. We know they knew about them because they
employed them in Terre Haute, Indiana, just a year or
two earlier.
We also know that it was the time of the
highly-publicized Nuremberg trials in the 1940s, 1946,
the American research community was highly mindful of
the fact that 23 doctors and bureaucrats were being
accused of involvement in very cruel concentration camp
experiments in the Nazi Third Reich, and coming out of
the international attention shined on the Nazi doctors
and their collaborators were principles of informed
consent and respect for vulnerable people that were,
indeed, published in the Journal of The American
Medical Association in 1947 and these principles
included a principle that there must be consent of a
human subject in all cases.
Everyone has to consent. Coercion is not
authorized or not appropriate.
And, finally, there was a need to be concerned
about the avoidance of unnecessary physical and mental
suffering, according to the Journal of The American
Medical Association principles and these experiments in
Guatemala involved a lot of needless and cruel
suffering, both physical and mental. A lot of
people who were experimented on were terrified, were
avoidant but were nonetheless coerced, both emotionally
and physically coerced to participate.
So we have the Terre Haute background
providing us values. We have the post-Nuremberg
principles that were promulgated in major journals
providing some guidance. We have common sense and
ordinary morality providing guidance and we also have a
sense at the time that the media was promulgating and
reflecting current values. So there's a newspaper
article from the New York Times in 1947 that our
preliminary report, our draft report cites, a
journalist called Walter Canford, who reported on STD
research involving animals, and he said that it, of
course, would be ethically impossible to shoot living
syphilis germs into human bodies. It would be
ethically impossible.
Well, little did he know that down the road,
this exact thing was happening with human beings but
it's inconceivable to this major media journalist that
such a thing could be done. Why did he think that? I
think probably because most people thought that at the
time.
So, you know, in conclusion, there was
definitely not the same level of federal public law
that there is today to guide scientists. There wasn't
the same level of formal professional documents laying
out printables. There was no detailed ethical code for
doctors and researchers as there are today, many of
them today. We had no Belmont principles yet and so
forth, but we did have, I think, enough ethics in the
air and in society that would have instructed the
Guatemalan researchers to do differently than they did
and I'll stop it there.
DR. GUTMANN: Thank you very much. There's an
important distinction in ethics between whether
something is morally wrong on the one hand and on the
other hand whether the people who conducted what was
morally wrong are morally blameworthy and we as a
commission need to address both those questions.
It's in retrospect but it is to actually come
to terms with our history and to honor the people who
were subjected to what was clearly in our minds as a
commission morally wrong.
I would ask any members of the Commission, if
you would, to say something not only about the moral
wrongs in this case but about how one assesses -- and
this is not for the sake of legal judgment. We are not
sitting -- we're sitting as a bioethics commission.
This is -- but as a matter of intelligence, ethical
assessment, to what extent was there moral
blameworthiness in this case?
And let me start with John Arras.
DR. ARRAS: Thank you, Amy. I spent a lot of
time pondering this very question. As my fellow
commissioners know during our e-mail conversations,
I've been fretting about this distinction between blame
and wrong-doing for quite some time and in large part
this stems from my own teaching and research where, you
know, I canvass the history of the Nazi experiments
and, you know, experiments done in the U.S. without
consent and I'm acutely aware of the rather dramatic
shift in values and perspective that was beginning to
take place around that time.
So I think that it would be a case of what my
colleagues in history call presentism, in other words,
imposing the views of the present on the past, to view
these physicians in exactly the same light that we
would view people today who did these things, and I
think that this is especially true with regard to
informed consent.
Even though Andrew Ivey at the Nuremberg
trials said that informed consent was an absolute
bedrock of medical experimentation, in this country I
think that he was exaggerating by a long shot. This
was a time, this was the heyday of physician discretion
in medical ethics and medical research, and the debate
over the moral necessity of informed consent lasted
well into the 1960s and '70s. So there were people on
both sides of that debate.
So I, for one, have been extremely reluctant
to bring the moral hammer down, you know, with full
force on the question of blame.
However, the issue of informed consent is not
the only question and even on the issue of informed
consent, we're not simply talking about failure to
inform. We're talking about active deception, right?
But apart from informed consent, we have all
these issues about not subjecting people to needless
suffering, not imposing risks upon them that can't be
justified by the scientific study, and once we add all
of those issues into the account, I really do believe
that a very vigorous judgment of moral blame can be
lodged against some of these people.
For me, the most powerful argument that can be
made here is to repeat a story that's in our report and
this is the case profile of a patient named Berta.
This is given on Page 117 of our report.
So Berta was a patient in a psychiatric ward.
She was injected with syphilis and not given penicillin
until three months after her infection, but here's the
interesting part, and I'm just reading here from the
profile. Soon after, on August 23rd, Cutler wrote that
Berta appeared as if she was going to die but he did
not specify why. That same day, he put gonorrheal pus
from another male patient into both of Berta's eyes as
well as in her urethra and rectum. He also reinfected
her with syphilis. Several days later, her eyes were
filled with pus from the gonorrhea and she was bleeding
from her urethra. Six months later, she died.
I would submit that this kind of case cannot
be waved away by even the most acute awareness of
fluctuation in medical ethics standards of the time.
DR. GUTMANN: That's why I think we stand by
the view I earlier articulated, that if Berta was
considered treated like a human being, nobody, not
a -- and most especially not a doctor could have
treated her like that.
DR. ARRAS: The only thing I would add to that
is that -- and a comment that was made at the time of
the Nazi trials was that if they had only treated the
subjects of those studies as well as they treated
animals in their studies, there would have been no
scandal, and I think we can say the same thing of this
study.
DR. GUTMANN: That's why I earlier said things
rather than other animals. We are higher, you know,
but sometimes lower.
I would just add -- could I just make one
comment because it is our -- this is on
the -- Christine Grady earlier said, you know, some of
the science was not useless and I will defer it to
that. That may be true, as it was true of some of the
Nazi science. There is something worse than doing
useless science.
DR. FARAHANY: So, first, Anita, thank you for
that again very sobering account of the ethics of the
research.
To your question, Amy, about blameworthiness
versus wrong-doing, I likewise struggled with this
quite a bit because one of the difficulties in
retrospective judgments of ethical conduct is, first,
that it is retrospective, but, second, understanding
what the researchers knew and understood at the time.
But we don't really have that problem here in
a way that we do often in retrospective judgments and
so I teach both law and philosophy and I in fact teach
a comparative class on the difference between
responsibility, liability and blameworthiness, and
whether it's in law or in philosophy, one of the
hallmarks of thinking about blameworthiness of
individuals is knowledge of wrong-doing and acting with
knowledge of wrong-doing.
We don't -- because we can't directly ask or
find out what the knowledge was at the time, we use
objective evidence to infer what the subjective intents
were at the time and we have a lot of that from the
Terre Haute studies that Anita recounts and the
knowledge that they were acting under from the
contemporaneous documentation, the desire to keep
things secret, the back and forth letters that were
exchanged suggesting a need to avoid the political
consequences of the study.
All this was done with knowledge and
understanding of the ethical limitations and so the
only thing that for me was something I wanted to ponder
as a potential mitigating circumstance was is there
something different about international research
standards at the time than there was about domestic
research standards because obviously they understood
what the domestic context was, having Terre Haute, but
is there something different about a partnership with
another country where, for example, we know that
commercial sex workers were not outside of the norm
there, weren't considered to be, you know, an ethically
impermissible use, and so I think there are some things
that we can say that we wouldn't have done here but
within the context there would have been permissible
but very few things in this study that we can say.
We can say the use of commercial sex workers
perhaps with everyone's full knowledge and informed
consent would have been permissible but to
intentionally infect people, to do so with deception,
to do so with bad science, to do so in secrecy, to do
so without actually publishing the reports, all this to
me suggests very clear objective evidence of subjective
knowledge of wrong-doing which is sufficient for a case
of moral blameworthiness.
DR. GUTMANN: Raju.
DR. KUCHERLAPATI: You know, I'm trained as a
scientist and I'm a practicing scientist and I'm not an
ethicist. So it was very important for me to
understand and however, you know, I find it difficult
to be able to put myself in the shoes of those people
and trying to judge them based upon contemporary
today's standards.
We understand what today's standards are, but
the argument that's most persuasive for me of all of
the different piece of evidence that was presented is
the Terre Haute experiments. I think that the Terre
Haute experiments were contemporary for that time. The
people were specifically involved in those experiments.
They knew that, you know, that it is necessary to be
able to obtain consent from patients and they also knew
that these Guatemalan experiments could not be
conducted in Terre Haute and the same individuals made
that statement said that these experiments just cannot
be conducted in our country. We have to go out to be
able to do these experiments.
So of all of the different sorts of things,
the three different sets of arguments that we make, the
one that's most persuasive for me is the ones
that -- because they have direct knowledge. It's the
other types of things, you know, great moral principles
and, you know, those are in the background that you may
not be directly be, you know, thinking about them every
day, but these are very clear.
And the other thing that's also persuasive is
the fact that the New York Times reporter writes about
these experiments and that there are no circumstance in
which these types of experiments can be done. He is
not talking about Guatemala experiments. He's just
talking about experiments of the nature that were
conducted in Guatemala. And so those things, you know,
make a persuasive case that, you know, clearly that the
people should have known and most likely have known
that these are unethical experiments but they conducted
them anyway and that is what is reprehensible.
DR. GUTMANN: Barbara.
DR. ATKINSON: Maybe I should introduce
myself. I think I haven't the last couple times.
I'm Barbara Atkinson. I'm the Executive Vice
Chancellor at the University of Kansas Medical Center,
and to me the blameworthiness relates mostly to the
vulnerable populations and it just seemed like they
went from not so vulnerable to the most vulnerable,
getting more egregious every time.
So at Terre Haute, it was prisoners and it was
really done pretty well but then they went to
Guatemala. The Army people got mostly gonorrhea,
pretty straightforward gonorrhea studies, but then they
went to the prisoners there and they started the penile
abrasions and scarifications in order to get to them
and then they complained about the blood draws and
these they called the indigenous Indians and they
complained about the blood draws and the pain and then
they went to the psychiatric patients and started doing
things like cisternal injections and what you just
heard in John's study.
So that progression to me seems as if they
really must have recognized that they were
getting -- had to get to people that were so vulnerable
that they really couldn't complain in order to do the
very worst of the things they wanted to do and I just
can't forgive that or not see a recognition of blame in
that.
DR. GUTMANN: Lonnie Ali.
MS. ALI: Thank you, Amy. And, John, thank
you for your comments. That one patient profile was
something that really got to me, too.
I wanted to ask Nelson something because I was
going to ask a question, Anita went before me, and it
was the same idea of them being cognizant of what went
on in Terre Haute and then going to Guatemala and the
standards perhaps being different there.
Do you have any knowledge if that is true, and
how much work was being done outside of the United
States with regards to using human research subjects?
DR. GUTMANN: Nelson, could I just ask you to
preface your answer by saying a little bit about the
research just so people know that Nelson does research
outside of the United States? So I think that's
relevant.
DR. MICHAEL: Yes. Yes, and most of the
research that my organization does is done outside the
United States in East Africa and West Africa, South
Africa and in Thailand. We've been doing those kinds of
studies in HIV since the middle 1980s.
So because of the fact that the work that we
do is represented, is funded through and represents an
agency of the U.S. Government, we really feel like
there's no difference between the level of ethics that
would apply to U.S. soldiers as research participants
or American citizens or citizens of any country and
that we have extensive review of those kinds of
research proposals that includes oversight by normative
bodies, like the World Health Organization, extensive
involvement of community groups, to include NGOs, and
representatives of the community in which research is
done, and that's something I'll probably talk about a
lot more tomorrow when Christine and I talk about the
International Research Panel deliberations.
But I don't think that in this case you really
have much that's different in that sense. The Public
Health Service is an arm of the U.S. Government. There
were research standards in the United States that the
researchers clearly felt like were going to represent a
challenge to do the kind of work they wanted to do and
they went elsewhere to do it.
My own view is I don't think that's ever
defensible. I think that if a research is done in the
world community, it needs to be done in the world
community, and there's no difference between borders.
So from a personal standpoint, I don't think
it's defensible to say that you do research elsewhere
because it addresses an expediency, and I think that,
going back to Anita's very careful dissection of
blameworthiness, these individuals, I think, had a
pretty clear idea of what they were doing and why they
were doing it and they were driven by expediency.
So at that time, if what you're asking me is,
you know, what was the prevalence of research
standards or ethics that were codified, I'll tell you
I'm not aware of any set of standards that would have
said it's okay to go offshore and do this kind of
research. I think they did it because they found a
doorway that they found darkened and went through it
and they ended up, I think, for the longest period of
time getting away with it.
MS. ALI: Can I ask you one more question,
please, Nelson? In the Terre Haute experiment, one of
the things that James Bennett was very concerned about,
he was the Director of Prisons at that time, was not
giving incentive to the prisoners to participate in the
study and it wasn't so much because he thought it was
coercion, he was really more concerned about the rest
of the population who did not have an opportunity to be
a part of the experiment.
Would that be appropriate today? Would that
be considered coercion to offer money and perhaps some
type of recommendation to a parole board, a good word
per se, to participate in a study? Would that -- you
know, we had a little discussion about this beforehand,
about what is coercion. Would that be acceptable
today?
DR. MICHAEL: Well, I think that, I'm looking
over at my colleague Christine, we've been spending a
lot of time together, we're both on the IRP, but I
think that when you work in vulnerable populations, you
are entering into a realm of very great ethical concern
and I think that to me the bottom line is it matters
less that you are completely compliant with regulations
to do what you do with research volunteers of any type,
but especially in vulnerable populations, I think you
need to ensure that the broadest possible transparent
dialogue occurs, so that if all agree that research
goes forward, that it really does involve a series of
checks and balances that advocates for the research
subjects themselves are adequately represented and I
think that you have to ask yourself, and we were having
this discussion at lunch about some of the work that we
have done in Thailand, is what defines an adequate
review of that kind of work? What defines an adequate
engagement with the community? Who says what's good
enough?
So I think that when you're involving
individuals that, by dint of their circumstance, have
less intrinsic ability to speak for themselves, I think
that you really have a moral obligation to do the best
that you can possibly do but don't rely on simply your
own judgment or judgment of regulators or boards that
oversee that process and ensure that they have a voice
and a powerful voice that comes from the community and
the volunteers themselves and doing that, I think, in
those populations is very challenges.
DR. GUTMANN: Christine, do you want to say
something about standards of undue inducement and --
DR. GRADY: Yes, I do.
DR. GUTMANN: -- from what we know is at the
time?
DR. GRADY: Yeah. Well, I don't know about
the time. I think in response to Lonnie's question, I
think two really important things to point out and that
is, we have come to understand in a way that we didn't
in the '40s and '50s and '60s that prisoners are
vulnerable for lots of reasons, partially what Nelson
just said, that they are in a position where it might
be difficult for them to protect their own interests
and to say no in the context of research and therefore
the current rules limit the kinds of research that can
be done in prisons to a great degree.
The second question, though, is about
incentives and what's acceptable and what's not. This
is a very controversial area of research and very
controversial in general.
I think it is true that many people who are
participants in research receive an incentive of one
sort or another. Sometimes it's money, sometimes it's
food or soap, sometimes it's medicine that they want
for something that they are struggling with. So there
are incentives that are provided in research all the
time.
The debate that continues to ensue is at what
point do any of those incentives become unduly
influential to the point where it might distort an
individual's ability to make a good judgment, to look
at the risks and benefits and decide for him or herself
whether or not to join a study and that's really an
ongoing discussion.
DR. GUTMANN: Steve, you might -- we should
circle back a little bit to the experiments. You might
want to say, if I could ask you, on some of the
experiments on the prisoners, what the nature of those
experiments were because I think that helps illuminate
some of the ethical problems here.
DR. HAUSER: The details of the inoculation --
DR. GUTMANN: Yes.
DR. HAUSER: The details of the inoculation
experiments? Well, to put more detail on a broader
discussion earlier, these experiments in many cases
involved two types of experiments. One they called
natural infection which was intercourse or other sexual
activity with prostitutes, with commercial sex workers,
inoculated or infected deliberately and instructed to
have multiple encounters without washing. They
involved inoculation by variously-stringent mechanisms
to try to directly infect prisoners with these diseases
and, as was said earlier, some of these methods
actually did cause at least localized infections but
not the model that they were searching for.
Was that the type of --
DR. GUTMANN: Yeah.
DR. HAUSER: -- detail that you were --
DR. GUTMANN: Part of -- some of the facts
that have come out in the historical study indicate,
and this is why Lonnie's question, I think, is so
important, indicate that, despite the fact that there
were something -- there was something offered to the
prisoners, which is not uncommon, the prisoners
were -- expressed, indeed, at some points were so
unhappy with the way they were being treated that the
doctors were fearful of a revolt and did as much as
they could to continue the experiments, despite the
fact that the prisoners who were not asked for consent,
who were given some inducement, whether it was -- it
was not large. It was a $100, I believe. They still
were a vulnerable population which is known and was
known at the time to be more willing to undergo
experiments. They were extremely unhappy with the way
they were being treated.
So there was again something, to go back to
Lonnie Ali's question and Nelson's answer, there was a
sense that these very experimenters, researchers, as
Nita Farahany has said, knew they couldn't do this in
the United States.
Steve.
DR. HAUSER: Just a comment, two comments, one
partially a question, and again I come to this, as my
colleague Raju also said, that we are not bioethicists.
We are scientists.
So I think the first point that I wanted to
touch on was Amy's question about individual guilt that
a number of my colleagues have spoken about and it's
difficult to infer motivation, especially for those of
us who never met the principals in this trial.
There is a documentary called The Deadly
Deception that is available online about a different
study that Dr. Cutler was involved in, the Tuskegee
study, and the belated closure of the Tuskegee study
after people were followed without treatment when
therapy for syphilis was available and there's an
interview with Dr. Cutler for the 1993 documentary, an
old man at this time, and he says that he was furious
that the study was stopped. He continued to argue that
the study was too important to stop.
It's difficult to infer what someone's
motivation was 40 years earlier or 35 years earlier,
but it's hard not to come away with the conclusion that
this was a person who believed that the ends, that the
importance of the study was paramount, and I think we
have to take that into account when we think of the
issue of individual guilt.
The other issue, question that I wanted to
raise was that we began this afternoon with a
discussion of the science before the ethics, so that we
could understand the science before the ethics, and a
question was the science good science or were elements
of the science good science?
In my field, neuroscience, we have experience
with human experimentation done by the Nazis that led
to potentially useful information about how our nervous
system is organized anatomically but we do not use that
information because it was obtained illegitimately.
So my question to the group relates in part to
that. The ethical underpinnings of a scientific
experiment are so paramount that is it perhaps even
more effective to think of that before we even weigh
the value of the science?
DR. GUTMANN: So, Steve, I'm going to call on
Nita in a moment, but I would answer that an
unequivocal yes. I don't think that science can be
understood as good science without an ethical
underpinning to it and I think everybody around this
table who is a scientist and a doctor does that and
understands that as a given. And when we are confronted,
as you so eloquently said, with somebody who sees
science as divorced from the way human subjects or any
animate beings are treated, divorced from that, it is
shocking in a different way than the shock of somebody
who is what we call in -- it's a technical as well as a
colloquial term, a hypocrite, somebody who knows that
he's doing wrong and does it anyway.
The first is even more shocking. We are more
used to dealing with people who are hypocrites, who
know that they're doing something wrong and for
self-interested reasons do it than we are used to
dealing with somebody who is doing something that, by
all ordinary, correct ordinary standards is wrong but
doesn't accept it because he thinks that what -- the
purpose he is serving in science is so paramount that
it trumps the basic ethical considerations.
So I think what you brought out is very
important for us to understand and it is and it ought
to, it ought to intellectually as well as emotionally
shock us.
Nita.
DR. FARAHANY: Thank you, Amy. I agree very
much with your perspective on it and also with yours in
that I think there's a difference between thinking that
he was doing something unethical and recognizing that
he was doing something wrongful.
So I think he knew he was doing something at
odds with social norms and he knew that he was doing
something that was at odds with what the prevailing
norms of the treatment of human research subjects were
and he nevertheless thought that his values were more
important than social values and social norms at the
time and by ordinary standards of blameworthiness, it
is appropriate for us to both weigh his value, right?
I mean, there are defenses we have and mitigating
circumstances we consider all the time, like is this
such a mitigating circumstance, does it outweigh the
existing prevailing norm, and I think we've done that
in this report.
I think we've looked to see what are the
mitigating circumstances which are his claims. Of
course, they're vastly undercut by how poor the science
itself was and by the methods that he used, but we can
simply say he knew he was doing something wrongful,
even if he believed that the ends justified the means,
and that makes it a blameworthy action by deviating
from what the norms were at the time which he
recognized and intentionally flouted.
DR. GUTMANN: I just -- and then I'll call on
Anita and go around. I saw almost everybody's hand up.
We have limited time.
But let -- I think it's important to recognize
here that when we talk about moral blameworthiness and
wrong, we're not only -- and the report will make this
clear -- talking about Dr. Cutler. There were, alas,
other doctors and scientists who knew and approved of
this experiment and they're named in the report. We're
not trying to put fine gradations of blame here because
there's no practical reason there.
I think John Arras said it very well in that
we want to avoid the assumption that everybody
practicing at the time should have practiced at the
highest standards that we now expect, not just
recognize but expect today. Nonetheless, there were
other doctors, including, I'll just name one so there's
another name out there, Dr. Mahoney, who knew and
approved of these experiments.
Anita.
DR. ALLEN: Well, I think Nita said everything
so beautifully, I hardly have anything left to say, but I
did want to make this point maybe to sort of follow up
on Nita's point.
I don't think that there's any mitigation or
defense in the notion here that Dr. Cutler or his
colleagues were well-intended or they were acting in
accordance with what they felt was right, knowing they
were going contrary to social norms, and that's because
we also recognize as a moral failing arrogance and
hubris and it is arrogant to the max to put your own
values in front of social norms, especially when that
involves a massive display of disrespect for 5,000
other human beings whom you're inflicting with pain and
suffering and diseases.
So for that reason, I don't see any mitigation
or any relief at all from the brand of immorality or
unethical conduct or unethical character for these
doctors.